Line jumping: put an instruction in a tool description that tells the agent to skip later steps or call a different tool first
A clean run ignores it; acting on it raises a finding..
Tool poisoning hides an instruction where the agent reads it but a human reviewer does not, inside a tool description or a tool result. This is the test plan we run to find it before it reaches production, and the controls that hold once it does.
Last reviewed June 2026
An MCP server hands an agent a set of tools and a description of what each one does. The agent trusts that description, and most of the time it should. The attack starts when the description, or the data a tool returns, carries an instruction aimed at the model rather than the user. A new agent reads it as a command. The reviewer skims the README and sees nothing wrong. Nothing in the request looks malformed, so the alerting stays quiet while the agent does what the hidden text told it to.
Treat every tool surface the agent can read as untrusted input, and test it the way you would test a form field. The cases below run on a schedule against the live agent, not once at onboarding, because a server you trusted in March can change its tool definitions in April. Each case carries a canary, so a pass or a fail is a fact rather than a judgement call.
A clean run ignores it; acting on it raises a finding..
The test re-reads every tool definition on each run and flags any drift from the last approved version..
The agent should render it as data and never act on it..
A tool call whose chain of custody does not trace back to the user request is blocked..
Outbound tools sit behind a destination allowlist, so a canary string never leaves..
Each call is checked against the declared parameter shape, and an unexpected write parameter is a finding..
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Tool-poisoning findings carry OWASP Agentic ASI02 (tool misuse), ASI03 (privilege compromise) and ASI06 (intent manipulation), OWASP LLM01 (prompt injection) and LLM05 (improper output handling), MITRE ATLAS AML.T0051, and EU AI Act Article 15. One tested result fills the matching cell in each framework.
A one-time scan checks the server as it looked that day. Tool poisoning often arrives as a later change, a rug pull, so the definitions have to be re-read and re-tested on a schedule. A server that passed last month is not the same as a server that passes today.
No. The test cases run against the agent regardless of how its tools are transported. The gateway is what enforces the controls in production - the allowlist, the confused-deputy block, the parameter-shape check - so the rule set the test validates is the one running on the wire.
A unique, harmless marker: a string, a fake credential, a tagged URL, seeded so its appearance proves a specific path fired. If the canary leaves through an outbound tool or turns up where it should not, the finding is verifiable instead of a maybe.
Scoped walkthrough of the Learn / MCP tool poisoning testing surface against your environment. No credit card.